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— THE RISK OF AUSTERITY CO-PRODUCTION 
IN CITY-REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN ENGLAND
Victoria HabermeHl and betH Perry
Abstract
This article examines the risk of what we term ‘austerity co-production’, a weak 
form of collaborative governance shaped by resource scarcity and fragmented, multiple 
forms of expertise. Despite the hope that co-production has radical potential to solve 
governance challenges across city-regions, not enough attention has been paid to the 
institutional contexts in which co-production is developed. We argue this institutional 
context is crucial in shaping how co-production comes to ground and the conditions it 
reproduces. We draw on a critical case study of metropolitan policymaking in Greater 
Manchester, England, to examine the gap between imagined and actual institutional 
contexts for co-production. We develop a framework that can be applied in different policy 
areas to assess the potential implementation of co-production in city-regional governance. 
Whilst the promise of co-production remains, we conclude that austerity co-production 
risks operating as an already-existing default solution to urban problems that constrains 
more innovative approaches to the governance and politics of the city-region.
Introduction
Recent urban scholarship has focused on co-production’s radical potential 
(Chatterton et al., 2017) as a way to address long-standing urban governance failures 
(Davies, 2011). In an international policy context, the New Urban Agenda now makes 
explicit reference to the need for local authorities to promote ‘enhanced civil 
engagement and co-provision and co-production’ (United Nations, 2017, italics added). 
In England, shortly after his election as the first city-regional mayor for Greater 
Manchester, Andy Burnham noted that ‘devolution means that you don’t just create a 
new form of top-down politics … there’s a hunger for some real change … you need to 
involve people in the co-production of services and government’ (Burnham interview, 
Taylor, 2017: 23).
Co-production apparently offers the promise to address intractable urban 
governance concerns, as the pinnacle of participatory governance (Rosen and 
Painter, 2019). Within urban studies, a particular application has been in the field of 
strategic spatial planning where emphasis has been on the bottom-up mobilization 
and empowerment of community groups (Mitlin, 2008; Albrechts, 2012; Parker and 
Street, 2018). However, fewer studies have focused on the emerging institutionalization 
of the co-production discourse and the contexts and conditions in which any ‘radical’ 
potential could be realized (cf. Perry and Atherton, 2017).
This is of particular concern in the English context. England has been ‘a 
landscape of almost permanent administrative reconfiguration … during the last 50 years’ 
(Ayres et al., 2017: 863). During the 2010s this manifested in the ‘devolution agenda’ in 
which English city-regions developed City Deals with central government in exchange 
for enhanced powers and responsibilities. In an era of widespread ‘austerity urbanism’ 
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(Peck, 2012), however, devolution has gone hand-in-hand with dramatic reductions in 
funding for local authorities, impacting the most vulnerable (Hastings et al., 2017).
This article advances the argument that the promise of co-production at the 
urban level is strongly mediated through such institutional contexts. Rather than 
co-production operating as a radical solution to existing deficits in urban policy 
and governance, the combination of devolution plus austerity policies in England 
raises the risk of what we have termed ‘austerity co-production’. We define austerity 
co-production as a weak form of collaborative governance reshaped by resource 
scarcity and fragmented, multiple forms of expertise. We do not dispute the potential 
of co-production per se––indeed we are motivated by concern with how progressive 
urban alternatives and social imaginaries can be brought into being in real institutional 
contexts (Fainstein, 2010). However, we argue that the failure to recognize how 
promise is mediated though institutional contexts leaves metropolitan authorities both 
determined and required to do more with less, whilst lacking the necessary resources 
and expertise to deliver.
This article next discusses the promise and radical potential of co-production 
as a solution to key governance challenges. We examine the distinctive context around 
devolution and austerity policies in England, before outlining the factors which 
constitute the risk of austerity co-production. In the third section, we draw on a case 
study of spatial policymaking in Greater Manchester, England, in order to illustrate 
these risks in practice. We ask how this understanding of existing institutional contexts 
modifies our assessment of the radical promise of co-production. Finally, in the 
concluding section we summarize the theoretical and actual risks which constitute the 
conditions in which austerity co-production may become the norm for English city-
regional governance.
Austerity co-production in England
Co-production has been described as an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Flinders 
et al., 2016: 263) referring to numerous processes and contexts, such as service delivery 
(Bovaird, 2007), policy design (Durose and Richardson, 2015), political ‘hell-raising’ 
(Cahn, 2008: 4) or forms of transdisciplinary knowledge production (Hemström 
et al., 2021). In this article we are concerned with co-production in urban settings, 
specifically related to (1) urban policy, decision making and governance in general, and 
(2) urban planning in particular.
 — Two lineages of co-production
In her seminal 1996 article in World Development, Elinor Ostrom set out her 
understanding of the notion of co-production as ‘the process through which inputs 
used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the 
same organization’ (1996: 1073). Charting the genesis of the term from the 1970s, when 
scholars were ‘struggling with the dominant theories of urban governance underlying 
policy recommendations’ (ibid.: 1079), Ostrom argued that the delivery of urban services 
was both more efficient and more democratic when the ‘great divide’ between ‘regular’ 
producers (usually the local state) and passive ‘clients’ as the recipients of such services 
were broken down. To achieve such aims, Ostrom set out four conditions which would 
help realize the promise of co-production, when (1) there is synergy between different 
entities such that ‘each has something the other needs’ (ibid.: 1082), (2) options are 
available to both partners, (3) there is credible commitment based on reciprocal and 
mutual contributions, and (4) there are incentives to encourage and enable inputs from 
officials and citizens. Several scholars have built on this tradition over the years to focus 
on designing for co-production (Durose and Richardson, 2015) and to develop further 
categorizations, such as co-creation, co-governance, co-design and co-implementation 
(Voorberg et al., 2015).
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In such accounts both the effectiveness and outcomes of policy are at stake. 
Ostrom notes that co-production is ‘crucial for achieving higher levels of welfare in 
developing countries, particularly for those who are poor’ (Ostrom, 1996: 1083). More 
recent work has also prioritized the urgency of including those who have most at stake 
and who are most affected in the co-production process. Mitlin (2008) has focused on 
co-production as part of the struggle for ‘choice, self-determination and meso-level 
political relations’ (ibid.: 347), where co-production is a fundamentally political process 
in which citizens seek to change the basis of their relationships with central agencies 
in addition to improving basic services. As such, co-production is seen as a means to 
redress the complexity of urban governance systems (Mitlin et al., 2019).
Others have emphasized the need to ensure that those with ‘lived experience’, of 
severe and multiple disadvantage for instance, are involved in service and policy design 
and delivery alongside professionals. For Rosen and Painter (2019), co-production is 
the gold standard of citizen participation. Fifty years since Sherry Arnstein developed 
her ‘ladder of participation’, they argue that Arnstein’s ladder is flawed in failing to 
tackle power differentials, overlooking issues of problem framing and oversimplifying 
participation as a binary between inclusion and exclusion, where inclusion implies 
greater power. They argue that co-production is a higher rung on the ladder of citizen 
participation, as collaboration alone cannot deal with such power asymmetries.
A second lineage of co-production has been developed in planning debates with 
justifications relating both to efficiency and democracy. On the one hand, co-production 
is seen as a way of dealing with the challenges of complexity and contestation around 
spatial issues. Spatial planning is a domain of substantive, strategic and institutional 
uncertainties which necessitates the need for transdisciplinary expertise and new 
modes of enquiry (May and Perry, 2018). On the other hand, co-production has also 
been seen as a means to increase participation in and the scope of planning thought 
(Watson, 2014). Albrechts (2012) charts the movement from co-production of public 
goods to empowerment and argues that: ‘the use of co-production as a central concept 
for strategic spatial planning is looked upon as a process of becoming, a process 
of negotiating and discussing the meanings of problems, of evidence, of (political) 
strategies, of justice or fairness and the nature of outcomes’ (ibid.: 57). In the field of 
spatial planning, co-production has been positioned as an alternative form of state–
society engagement central in the debate around the context, conditions and outcomes 
of the ‘post- collaborative’ turn (Parker and Street, 2018).
 — ‘Solutions’ and preconditions for co-production
We propose that co-production has been seen as a ‘solution’ to particular sets of 
urban challenges––relating to longstanding urban inequalities, the deficits of democratic 
processes and the increasing complexity and ‘wickedness’ (Head and Alford, 2015) of 
urban issues. However, if co-production is to ‘solve’ urban problems and deliver its 
radical promise, we posit that a number of institutional preconditions need to be in 
place (see Table 1).
The issue is that existing literature on co-production has tended to pay little 
attention to the institutional contexts of implementation, in which the radical promise 
of co-production would be realized. Many studies have focused on examples of 
bottom-up mobilization or empowerment from within communities, rather than on 
existing institutions. This work is critical, but we argue, does not take into account how 
co-production operates and is mediated through organizational settings. Work on the 
‘just city’ for instance focuses on the need to think about alternative institutional designs 
as part of a pragmatic politics of social reform (Fainstein, 2010: 184) and the need to 
consider actual rather than imagined institutions (Young, 1990: 22).
Far greater attention needs to be paid to actually existing institutional contexts 
and to understanding the extent to which such governance settings meet the three sets 
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of institutional preconditions. To illustrate this further, we turn now to the example of 
how devolution, neoliberal state restructuring and austerity policies in England mediate 
co-production’s radical intent.
 — English city-regionalism in an era of austerity
In the UK, regional governance has been in a long phase of flux. Initiated 
under a Labour government in 1999, a process of regionalization began with the 
creation of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) outside London. The seeds for 
the reconfiguration of spatial governance at the city-regional level were also put in 
place with a range of initiatives such as Multi-Area Agreements and Local Strategic 
Partnerships (Tallon, 2010). With the election of a Conservative-Liberal coalition 
in 2010, the abolition of the RDAs swiftly followed, replaced by a new tier of multi-
actor governance structures across local authority boundaries. City-regions began to 
enter into bilateral ‘city deals’ with central government to secure devolved powers and 
responsibilities, granted on the basis of strong cross-boundary partnerships and certain 
imposed conditions (such as the direct election of a city-regional mayor). The 2016 
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act provided further policy architecture to 
underpin such developments, although metropolitan areas could select limited options 
(Sandford, 2017).
Scholarly critique has centred both on the extent to which different processes 
of decentralization have actually led to greater opportunity for local participation, 
and the economic orthodoxy of what is produced (Baker and Wong,  2013). The 
UK is still ‘super-centralised’ (Hambleton, 2017: 3); indeed, the tendency has been 
to see the devolution of responsibility without resource, with high maintenance of 
control from the centre. Devolution from central and regional governments to local 
levels is a common feature of neoliberal governance (Jones and Ward, 2004), whilst 
others argue that decentralization efforts in England have failed to address issues of 
democratic disaffection and exclusion (Blunkett et al., 2016). The risk is of greater 
spatial differentiation and inequality (Waite et al., 2013) which presumes that city-
regional authorities and councils can ‘earn autonomy’ if they follow the rules set down 
by central government (Tait and Inch, 2015), reflecting an ongoing strategy of ‘elite 
localism’ (Cochrane et al., 1996). The effect of these changes is to re-energise questions 
over forms of urban governance and decision making (Ayres et al., 2018). Described 
as a ‘devolution deception’ (Hambleton, 2017), or ‘disorganized’ (Shaw and Tewdr-
Jones, 2017), scholarly critique suggests the manifestation of devolution to date does not 
provide the conditions for genuine democratic empowerment in the English city-regions.
In England, devolution has run alongside a rollback in state funding. ‘Austerity 
urbanism’ (Peck, 2012) has produced new forms of urban governance (Davies et 
al., 2018). Research has examined austerity’s multi-scalar effects (Kitson et al., 2011), 
as well as variegated impacts on everyday life practices (Hall, 2019). The reduction in 
TABLE 1 ‘Solutions’ and preconditions for co-production
Challenges to which co-production  
is posited as a solution
Institutional preconditions to realize co-production as 
a ‘solution’
The failure of existing processes to deal with chronic urban 
injustice
Structures and processes for those who have ‘most at 
stake’ to be engaged as equal partners; bespoke and 
tailored processes for participation; time and resources for 
engagement; active tackling of structural inequalities
The lack of transparency and exclusiveness of existing 
processes of decision making
Transparent and legible decision and policymaking 
processes; options to contribute and change outcomes; 
clear understanding of parameters and timeframes; space 
for contestation and debate
The complexity of urban issues requiring diverse skills and 
expertise
Cultures of epistemic equality; different inputs recognized as 
valuable and distinctive; openness to new ideas.
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public funding by the UK Coalition government was described as the most significant 
in over 50 years (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). For Hastings et al. (2017) the implementation of 
cuts through local government is a central element of urban austerity attacks in England, 
alongside the growth of neoliberal agendas (Fuller and West, 2017). City-regions inherit 
the implications of austerity, whilst central government cuts the purse strings and 
simultaneously devolves responsibility, further reinforcing the new ‘centralism’ (Prosser 
et al., 2017). Devolution pushes responsibility downwards, whilst austerity removes the 
capacities with which cities could act (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). Without regional 
planning agencies and strategies, local authorities have had ‘few alternatives’ but to 
institute austerity policies (Peck, 2012: 648).
 — The risk of austerity co-production
In England, there are profound implications of the opening up of governance 
to ‘co-production’ in the austerity urban context outlined above. The simultaneous 
devolution of responsibilities and reduction of resources means metropolitan authorities 
must respond to the ‘perfect storm’ (Chatterton et al., 2017: 226) in increasingly complex 
urban environments. The conditions under which austerity devolution is being instituted 
means some councillors worry that there will be ‘nothing left for government to devolve 
to’ (Colomb and Tomaney, 2016: 12). With these critiques in mind, Watson’s (2014: 65) 
reminder that co-production in planning can be ‘cost-effective state service delivery 
rather than community empowerment as an end in itself ’ is timely. During austerity 
conditions, co-production may engender a ‘race to the bottom’, rather than a means of 
democratizing public services (Fotaki, 2015).
In the English context, the spectre is raised of what we have called ‘austerity 
co-production’, a weak form of collaborative governance for dealing with resource 
scarcity and fragmented, multiple forms of expertise in the context of devolution 
and austerity. Austerity co-production risks reproducing austerity whilst promising a 
radical solution. The context of austerity urbanism perpetuates and is perpetuated by 
‘deficit, devolved risk and destructive creativity’ (Van Lanen, 2020: 221), which results 
in municipalities being urged to do ‘more with less’ in imperfect governance settings. 
Under such conditions it is unsurprising that municipalities are looking for new forms 
of service delivery and governance––such as co-production––that can help them achieve 
this.
What might co-production look like, produced under such conditions? We 
argue that the risk of austerity co-production is heightened by the dramatic reduced 
capacity and capabilities of metropolitan governance under conditions of austerity 
devolution. The result is an increasingly challenging context for the institutional 
preconditions of co-production to be met. First, in order to centre the needs of those 
most affected by a particular policy problem, local authorities would be required to have 
a clear understanding of who would need to be involved and what mechanisms could 
facilitate participation. This in turn would require designing bespoke processes which 
would best enable specific groups to be involved. Structures for engagement would 
be required with the time and resources available for officers to develop meaningful 
forms of participation. This means not only providing the opportunity to participate, 
but addressing the structural barriers and power inequalities that prevent them from 
doing so and which pre-date austerity conditions. In a context of austerity devolution, 
where fewer public officials are required to deliver more with less, there is a risk that 
participation is layered on top of existing structures and processes, with cost-efficient 
one-size-fits-all solutions and with few incentives or resources to aid engagement.
Second, co-production requires transparent and open decision-making processes 
in which partners can take part as equals, with a shared understanding of the parameters 
and timeframes for policymaking. This also means spaces for debate, processes for 
navigating disagreement and contestation and the possibility of new alternatives being 
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developed. The risk is that the emergent and imperfect devolution agenda in England, 
and the specific manifestation of the ‘City Deals’, prioritize negotiations with central 
government and across local authority boundaries, rather than with citizens, service 
users or affected community groups. Furthermore, austerity and devolution combined 
create a landscape that shapes spatial decision making, whereby the ‘crisis of consensus 
governance’ ‘forecloses, all but narrow debate and contestation around a neo-liberal 
growth agenda’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012: 92). The evolution of policymaking 
processes and structures under devolution has left decision-making processes unclear, 
potentially rendering strategy-making opaque and specialized.
Third, the neoliberalization and politicization of both devolution and austerity 
policies shape the potential for institutional cultures to value different forms of 
expertise. Whilst multi-disciplinarity and cross-sectoral knowledge is needed to 
address complex issues, particularly in areas of spatial planning (Vigar, 2012), ‘technical 
knowledge’ is prioritized over more social and contextual forms of expertise (Mazza 
and Bianconi, 2014). Following the deregulation, liberalization and privatization of key 
elements of urban infrastructure––including planning, housing and transport––there 
is a risk that an austerity context leads to the dominance of market forces and private 
sector interests as privileged policy inputs. Running alongside austerity cuts to public 
sector budgets since 2010 has been a parallel programme of ‘simplification’ of planning 
regulation, incentivizing new development, reducing legislation, accelerating planning 
decision making and facilitating private sector growth––measures which run counter to 
the aspirations for meaningful and genuine participation.
So far, we have argued that institutional contexts matter in the search to realize 
the radical promise of co-production. We have set out a series of institutional conditions 
that would be conducive to co-production, and reassessed these in light of the actually 
existing context of devolution and austerity policies in England. In so doing, we highlight 
factors that raise the risk of austerity co-production. We now turn to an illustrative case 
study of an actually existing policymaking context in a specific devolved city-region 
in England, Greater Manchester. How issues are negotiated and organized in practice 
shapes the potential of co-production as a ‘solution’ to urban governance challenges.
Examining austerity co-production through an actually existing 
policymaking context
In examining existing policy processes and institutional contexts, our empirical 
research further substantiates the concept of austerity co-production as a risk looming 
over English city-regional governance. Nonetheless, we contend that working from 
the actual to the potential is an important step in moving ‘beyond critique’ (Perry and 
Atherton, 2017). We draw on a critical case study of an actually existing metropolitan 
policymaking process in order to assess the conditions in which the promise of 
co-production might be realized. A critical case study approach is deliberately selected 
to provide detailed empirical analysis of a particular phenomenon, taking theoretical 
or conceptual notions and deconstructing them as practices in specific contexts 
(Harvey, 1990; May and Perry, 2011). The goal of analysis is to examine a critical case as 
a resource for exploring wider issues, ‘with the purpose of “confronting” theory with 
the empirical world’ (Piekkari et al., 2009: 569). For the purposes of this research, it is 
important to emphasize that the object is not to study co-production, but to assess actual 
institutional processes of policymaking against those pre-conditions we set out above.
Our critical case is of the process of strategic spatial planning in Greater 
Manchester, England, between 2017 and 2019. Greater Manchester is a city-region 
comprised of 10 individual local authorities or districts––in North West England 
(Manchester, Salford, Trafford, Bolton, Bury, Wigan, Oldham, Tameside, Rochdale 
and Stockport). Greater Manchester is seen as a ‘first mover’ (Coleman et al., 2016: 
377) amongst English city-regions, as the first outside London to sign a ‘city deal’ 
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with central government and establish a Combined Authority across local authority 
boundaries (GMCA, 2014). One of the first joint actions of the new combined authority 
was developing the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework (GMSF), intended to 
provide a blueprint for development across the region. In the context of institutional 
flux and uncertain boundaries and legitimacy, this was seen as an important test-bed for 
the new governance arrangements. Furthermore, Greater Manchester is often posited 
as a test case, where dynamics are illuminated and magnified (Peck and Ward, 2002; 
Hincks et al., 2017). In the English context, this is due not only to Greater Manchester’s 
desire to fulfil its ‘destiny’ of metropolitan greatness (Coleman et al., 2016: 377), but 
also the result of long histories of municipal partnership working (Kenealy, 2016). 
Indeed, the ‘Manchester Model’ has been presented and critiqued as a set of governance 
arrangements and mode of economic development which other city-regions should 
either aspire to, or should learn from (Haughton et al., 2016).
The wider context for the case study of the GMSF as a policymaking process is 
further set against the backdrop of Greater Manchester’s mode of city governance’ (ibid.) 
funding urban redevelopment through an ‘entrepreneurial turn’ (Peck and Ward, 2002; 
Ward, 2003). As a posterchild for such forms of private sector led redevelopment, the 
city-region’s ‘success’ in channelling international capital is clear from the changes to 
the urban centre and housing financialization (Silver, 2018). As the case study shows, the 
legacy of Greater Manchester’s famed collaborative governance arrangements, and the 
relationships with private sector developers, are key factors alongside austerity policies 
which constrain the potential of co-production.
Between 2017 and 2018 we undertook 12 situated interviews with strategic 
planners across all 10 local authorities in Greater Manchester and within the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA), providing unique access to and insight on 
the internal dynamics of policymaking. Whilst a small sample, all of these interviewees 
directly worked on producing the GMSF and were taking part in its rewriting. Situated 
interviewing took place in participants’ usual places of work, enabling participants’ 
interactions with the setting to contribute to the dataset. We also undertook four 
focus groups and workshops attended by 32 individuals with links to a wide range 
of community groups, campaign groups, local authorities, consultancies, housing 
developers and citizens over the period coinciding with the consultation on the second 
re-write of the GMSF (January–March 2019). At the same time, GMCA was interested in 
the research, and facilitated interview access, participated in policy events (September 
2018), and attended community focus groups (January 2019). We include this process 
of engagement as a source of data for the case study, seeing the role of the researcher 
to ‘co-construct perceived reality through the relationships and joint understandings 
we create in the field’ (Simons, 2009: 23). Interviews were recorded and transcribed; 
the data was coded and analysed according to the three preconditions outlined in 
Table 1: structures and processes for participation, the transparency of decision-making 
processes, and cultures of epistemic diversity.
 — The GMSF: ‘the plan for jobs, homes and the environment’
The development of the GMSF took place against the background of multiple 
reconfigurations of scalar strategies for strategic planning since the 1980s. From regional 
spatial strategies, unitary development plans, local plans and core strategies, planning 
in the city-region had already been subject to the shifting priorities of successive 
governments. In the 2010s local authorities were placed under new pressure to 
develop a local plan to deliver on Government’s concern to address housing shortages. 
Such plans needed to show a 5-year pipeline of land for new housing in line with 
government targets, with consultation a statutory requirement alongside a duty to 
cooperate (Haughton, 2018). Any local authorities unable to show an up-to-date plan 
and associated statistics could be penalized, facing the prospect of experts being brought 
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in to develop one. Salford, Bury and Tameside were all at risk, with local plans that were 
out of date or not adequate for current requirements.
Given the strong history of metropolitan voluntary collaboration through 
the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), planners across the 10 
Greater Manchester (GM) districts had already been collaborating around issues such 
as transport and waste, and decided to instigate a joint spatial plan in August 2014, for 
intended submission in 2017. Motivated by an increased need to prove housing supply, 
and a greenbelt which had not been reviewed since the 1980s, the decision was made 
to develop a strategic 20-year plan. Nonetheless, the development of the GMSF had to 
follow National Planning Policy guidance within the context of a planning system based 
on common law and precedence.
The draft GMSF was published in October 2016 to cover the period to 2035 
described by Hodson et al. (2020) as being based on ‘heroic’ GVA growth assumptions 
of 2.5% year on year, with population growth of 294,800, an additional 199,700 jobs and 
a requirement for 227,200 net new homes. The plan started life as a joint development 
plan, ‘more of a super local plan’ (interviewee) than a spatial strategy, with the intention 
that regulation introduced as part of the devolution deal would subsequently enable a 
more strategic view. Unlike other areas of policy in the devolution agreement––and in 
contrast to the London mayoral model––any decision on the GMSF required unanimity 
between all 10 local authority districts and the Mayor.
The first public consultation document on the GMSF elicited widespread 
dissatisfaction, from greenbelt groups, the developer lobby and an ‘awakened citizenry’ 
(Hodson et al.,  2020: 14). Andy Burnham was elected as the first metropolitan 
mayor in 2017 and promised a ‘radical rewrite’ of the GMSF. The regulations for a 
spatial development strategy were still not in place, so the process continued as a 
joint development plan. A second consultation document was produced and went to 
consultation from January–March 2019.1
Our research took place between the period of the ‘radical rewrite’ and up to 
the second consultation period. As noted above, the object of our case study is not 
co-production per se, nor the content of the GMSF, but what the process reveals about 
the institutional conditions for policymaking in which the promise of co-production 
might land.
 — Inclusive structures for participation and engagement?
Consultation is a statutory requirement for planning within a clear legal framework. 
Each of the 10 districts had a Statement of Community Involvement which shaped the 
way that different authorities undertook engagement. Overall, during the consultation on 
the first public draft, there were more than 80 public events and over 27,000 consultation 
responses submitted online, by letter and email. An online portal––mappinggm.org.
uk––was developed to support the GMSF through the creation of interactive maps. This 
involved a ‘call for sites’ between 2015 and 2017 to be considered as options for both 
the 2016 and the revised 2019 draft of the GMSF. Alongside local events, determined by 
respective Statements of Community Involvement, social media was relied upon initially 
as a ‘cost effective’ means of communication. One planner noted a sense of pride that they 
had managed to ‘go beyond legislative requirements of a notice in a newspaper … or on a 
lamppost … none of us are that limited’.
In reflecting on the first consultation period, the context of austerity was 
foremost in planners’ minds. Between 2008-2018 budgets within local authorities in 
Greater Manchester had been dramatically reduced, with direct implications on the 
1 The original plan was that there would be a further consultation on the GMSF in June/July-September 2020, with 
examination by Government in 2021. There are now suggestions this will be delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
See https://www.placenorthwest.co.uk/news/mixed-messages-over-gmsf-future/ (accessed June 2020).
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capacity of planning officers responsible for the GMSF, in some districts reducing 
from 12 to 3 full time equivalent planners. This meant that the time to think about 
participation in the process diminished: ‘we weren’t even treading water; we were 
going backwards’. This planner reported that most of their time was spent dealing with 
‘complaints’ and ‘ombudsmen’ rather than ‘core work’. Comparisons with London were 
often made––one interviewee reporting that the development of the London Plan was 
supported by 60 planners, compared with just 3 full-time planners in the GMCA. On top 
of fraught and often difficult negotiations between local authorities, planners stated that 
the reduction in staffing and increased responsibility meant that there was little time 
for innovative approaches, creating a tension between the demand to ‘work and manage’ 
rather than ‘time to think, when there are other things to do’.
Miscommunication regarding the first consultation had led to a popular 
misconception that using online consultation forms carried less weight than letters, 
resulting in a heavy postbag which had to be physically input: ‘that took months and 
really did slow us down’. With both time and financial scarcity, officers relied on simplest 
and most familiar methods, whilst acknowledging their deficits. Public events were not 
always well attended by people, or indeed by relevant officers able to offer coherent 
explanations to members of the public. One planner spoke about being ‘outgunned by 
housing developers and under siege by public opposition, when there are no resources 
to engage communities effectively’.
Time and resource issues were exacerbated by internal cultures which 
prioritized ‘messaging’ over ‘engagement’. With no parallel in-house expertise around 
public participation, engagement was managed by the communications team involving 
public relations managers and branding, digital and social media officers. Recognizing 
that they were failing to handle social media engagement during the first consultation, 
communications consultants had also been brought in at the last minute to develop a 
media campaign––however, this did little to mitigate the sense from the public that 
the GMSF had ‘come from nowhere’, with the GMCA process perceived as about 
information control, rather than participation and engagement.
The result of these conditions and constraints was a risk-averse and stifled 
process of decision making, which ‘stops people trying new things … we are pushed into 
the sort of conservatism of just doing things as we have done them in the past’. One result 
was to potentially exacerbate rather than address inherent structural inequalities across 
districts. In the context of economic disparities between areas of Greater Manchester, 
particularly between the northern and eastern districts and those in the central and 
southern core, some planners had hoped that a collective approach would ‘rebalance 
that in terms of economic growth’, or enable housing allocation targets to be addressed 
across districts. However, under conditions of austerity, in which resources depended 
in part on the strength of the local tax base, some districts were more able to represent 
their interests in the GMSF process than others. All districts were asked to second one 
full-time equivalent planner to work on the GMSF; however, not all had the resources 
to do so, resulting in differential levels of influence. Those that were able to easily 
access GMCA offices in central Manchester were perceived to enjoy further advantage, 
compared with those more distant districts that experienced a reduction in day-to-day 
policy influence.
Alongside spatial imbalance in structures for influence and participation, 
the process was marked by no clear sense of whose interests were really at stake. 
In general, some groups felt largely excluded, with few routes for participation, 
which was reflected in one community focus group: ‘we are very conscious of, I am 
anyway, about hitting the institutional barriers and that when you get so far, trying 
to get into a system, you’ll find that the doors are closed and you’re not treated as 
an equal’. Specifically, some voices were seen to be more valuable than others. With 
the perception that the first round of consultation had been dominated by greenbelt 
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activists and ‘shouty environmentalists’, officers within GMCA sought to redefine 
who mattered in the consultation: ‘we want to move focus away from people at the 
edges, away from the angry green belt people, more towards young people who really 
have a stake’ (italics added). Whilst the engagement strategy had initially embraced 
social media, paradoxically, these same responses were simultaneously dismissed by 
officials, precisely because of the way they had been submitted. The twitter sphere was 
disregarded as enabling the loudest voices to steal airtime and written responses were 
dubbed as irrelevant for commenting on spatial issues that were ‘out of scope’––despite 
the ‘scope’ never being clear in the first place.
Following the first consultation, GMCA undertook a ‘risk workshop’ to ‘scope 
out what worked well and didn’t work well last time’, facilitated by the Consultation 
Institute. This led to a more coordinated communications and engagement strategy for 
the second round of consultation in 2019, including a new consultation hub (gmconsult.
org), web pages, newsletter and mailing list, a mayoral event, drop in district events, and 
information cards. Three sector specific consultations took place with greenbelt groups; 
the voluntary sector, community and social enterprise sector, and disability groups. In 
all 67,000 comments were received on the second consultation document in 2019, from 
around 17,500 people (GMCA, 2019).
 — Transparent decision-making processes?
As noted above, decisions on the GMSF required unanimity between all 10 of 
the local authorities and the city-regional mayor. This meant that each district had to 
represent their own aims in the joint plan, in a manner that would gain approval from 
the others. Levels of being ‘in the know’ about the process varied from district to district 
and few could articulate clear decision-making processes. The fluidity and uncertainty 
of the changing context, particularly given the novelty of the new Mayoral arrangements 
and the resulting politicization of the GMCA, meant that institutional landscapes and 
processes were unclear and evolving. Requests made by the research team for decision-
making flowcharts or diagrams were not able to be met; our own efforts to represent the 
process elicited uncertain responses. Some planning interviewees reported that they 
were ‘not senior enough’ or ‘didn’t need to understand the structures further up’, whilst 
others referred to the ‘not linear, but collaborative’ process of plan making.
For those in positions of authority, the safety net on which such uncertainties 
could be navigated was the strong ‘origin’ story, or ‘myth’ (Haughton et al., 2016) 
articulated and rearticulated across the city-region. The ‘Manchester model’ established 
over the last 30 years has advocated for the city-region as the appropriate scale 
for devolved powers. Although this story and model has been widely debated and 
critiqued, with local actors challenging this regional scale (Deas et al., 2020), it remains 
entrenched. Each of the planners interviewed––even those more recently in post––told 
their own version, as a response to specific questions about how decisions got made: 
‘with all the districts in Greater Manchester there’s been a long history of collaborative 
working in GM. I think it dates back to the Greater Manchester Council in the eighties, 
long before my time’. Collaboration and co-working was the bedrock, the certainty, on 
which new governance uncertainties could be managed. Often this origin story, such as 
in the example above, was offered in lieu of any account of how authority and decision 
making actually worked. Whilst district planning groups had their own ways of creating 
statistics and political processes, differences between districts were only identified in 
the process of reaching common agreement, as one planner noted: ‘we hadn’t really 
quite appreciated that because we’d thought everybody must be the same’.
Within the process there was little space for, or value associated with, 
contestation and debate. In a heavily regulated, quasi-judicial process, the need 
for unanimity drove contestation underground behind a process of watering down 
and trading up between local authorities. There was no formal process for dealing 
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with differences between districts; instead, it was left to planners to deal with ‘non-
meshing’ of interests. This absence of a clear process for recognizing and dealing with 
difference further tended to a lowest common denominator approach: ‘you almost 
dance a minimum bottom line’, with most people seeking to defend their district’s 
position. Some particularly contentious issues were initially left off the agenda, such 
as housing affordability. Here there were clear differences between a Manchester-
centric approach focused on attracting affluent, young professionals and highly skilled 
workers, and an approach championed by district leaders concerned with deprivation, 
accessibility and affordability. One official noted that ‘you would have to read the 2016 
consultation document very carefully to find the sentence which mentioned affordable 
housing … there was a very strong view from the leaders that that was an issue which 
should be left to the local planners’.
The process of negotiating across authority boundaries was both time-consuming 
and hidden, reducing time to engage in wider participation or engagement around a 
strategic vision for the city-region. The intention to address both strategic planning 
and regional housing allocations introduced a competing rationality at the heart of the 
GMSF, between the long-term vision and imaginaries required of a future-oriented plan, 
and the short-term practicalities of allocating land for housing. This led to a sense from 
planners that the public was having the wrong kind of debate. Of the 27,000 responses 
to consultation on the 2016 draft of the GMSF, the majority concerned specific site 
allocations: ‘we are getting comments on housing sites, but what we actually want to 
know is what views do people have on what sort of housing we should be building, on 
what sort of housing younger people think they’d be comfortable with now in 5, 10, 
15, 20 years’ time?’ Not acknowledging the fundamental competing rationality, one 
officer framed this instead as being about people’s interpretive capacity and ability to 
understand sites in terms of ‘direct impacts, but not policies’. The same issue manifested 
during the second consultation, where 79% of responses were on allocations rather than 
thematic priorities (GMCA, 2019).
The parameters and framing of the consultation as both about strategic priorities 
and housing allocations were not clear or well served by a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Alongside the absence of discussion about the greenbelt since the 1980s and the context 
of austerity policies, the consultation on the GMSF was informed by people’s prior 
experiences of local planning decisions where one community participant noted that 
plans are ‘being done to us rather than for us’. Against this background, one senior 
official noted that ‘when they [the public] got the chance to comment on something like 
the spatial document, all these issues came out’. This was generally framed by planners 
as their failure to educate, or the public’s failure to understand––rather than a failure 
of the overall process with its lack of parameters, unclear scope and spaces for debate.
The impact of the negative response to the first round of consultation and 
widespread press coverage (Manchester Evening News, 2017; BBC news, 2017) led 
to more ‘managing’ and ‘messaging’, than processes to identify and deal with tricky 
issues. Our own research workshops were evaluated positively by participants for 
providing spaces for debate and engagement across sectors that were otherwise missing, 
enabling ‘a new kind of forum … not the usual groups that I come across’. For officials, 
lack of ‘noise’ was considered a ‘success’, rather than any indication of disengagement 
with the long, arduous and ever-moving process of consultation. Contestation was not 
only discouraged but also actively avoided, underpinned by a nostalgia for past eras 
where people were ‘more deferential … working within a local authority, you are now 
challenged on absolutely everything’.
 — Culture of epistemic diversity?
The process of power-sharing, in a context of veto politics and a race to find 
minimum agreements, was accompanied by the marginalization of planning expertise 
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and the dismissal and devaluing of citizens as experts. First, planners were concerned 
over how their roles had changed and their function in mediating competing knowledge 
claims: ‘you’re an expert in making sense of a lot of different competing demands on 
physical land use and so on … it has changed because it has got a lot more technical’. 
Recent changes in national planning policy had led to an absence of sufficient guidance 
whereby the task of mediating competing claims was increasingly challenging, 
pushing planners to agree certain conditions, exacerbated by the increased pressure 
to make rapid decisions and ensure continued growth and development. Critically, 
this undermined the legal basis on which relations with the private sector could be 
negotiated and maintained. Cuts to departments led to an outsourcing of parts of 
the planning process, but with a parallel increase in workload around managing the 
integration of private and public expertise.
The shift from strong to weak guidance and regulation with a focus on targets 
encouraged officers to make assessments based on numerical viability, rather than 
long-term visionary local planning. Another planner reflected that this focus on targets 
meant that ‘the sand is constantly shifting beneath your feet’. Such insecurity meant that 
planners deployed their expertise not in service of the best possible planning outcomes, 
but to navigate such constantly shifting terrains of practice. Independent consultants 
were mobilized to play a key role in the context of reduced in-house capacity. One 
planner lamented the ‘parachuting in’ of experts, making processes both ‘more generic 
and slower’; at the same time, other districts had moved to establish their own planning 
consultancy which could then provide paid services to others, generating revenue. 
Many planners also reflected on the need for ‘experts’ to carry out various reports and 
assessments as they did not have the skills in house, and they would need to prove expert 
input, for example through landscape or environmental impact assessments.
Planners widely noted the decreased ability to resist the pressures of developers 
in the context of reduced resources and limited devolved powers. Some planners had 
absorbed private sector rationalities with a need to perform an ‘intelligent client role’, 
‘go for growth’ and ‘move to delivery and deliverability’. Others however were acutely 
aware of the limited capacity of planners to resist such pressures: ‘the view that as a 
council official, I should just be able to tell the developer what to do, you know, and 
stop them from doing what the residents don’t want them to do. It doesn’t quite work 
like that’. Developers able to employ professional representors to advise them were at 
a distinct advantage: ‘where you draw the line on a map can make a difference between 
agricultural land values … when that’s the case, people will put a lot of time and resource 
into trying to get what they want’.
Second, the marginalization of professional planning expertise went hand in 
hand with the devaluing of community knowledge. The time-consuming nature of 
local authority negotiations with developers and consultants led to an ‘invisibilization’ 
of community expertise. Community engagement was pushed to the end of the policy-
development timeline. Planners saw their roles as ‘balancing community interest 
with the private interest’, but the language, process and legal frameworks limited the 
accessibility and understanding required for communities to express ‘interest’ in the 
first place. One community member recognized the need to change tactics to game 
the system by enrolling developers themselves, noting that if you ‘come back with a 
developer … we will find the doors will open again because we’re not just a community 
group’.
Some planners recognized that planning was too complex for lay members of 
the public to understand without adequate translation, but noted the absence of time 
to do this: ‘it’s asking a lot of people without giving them any training or knowledge 
to start out with’. Planners held contrasting opinions on the integration and value of 
citizen expertise, as well as what sort of knowledge was valuable. One planner noted 
that citizens were ‘very familiar’ with their own areas and it was therefore ‘important to 
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listen to what people have to say’, although this local knowledge was difficult to translate 
into a planning framework. This was a view reinforced by citizens involved in such 
processes: ‘when it came to planning applications that the council was trying to push 
through, we actually knew more than they did about the land’. At the same time, some 
planners dismissed expertise from citizens, as telling planners ‘what we already know’. 
Planners also acknowledged that certain groups had more time to examine applications 
than planners working in austerity conditions: ‘some retired people, who will spend 
time, probably more time, looking through what we’ve put up online, than any one of us 
has time to do’. The consequence is that only those with time on their hand or skills to 
translate community knowledge into accepted forms of expertise are able to be heard.
The deep sense of place that communities could offer as inputs to a strategic 
vision and spatial planning process was largely dismissed. Citizens themselves 
articulated the value of their expertise clearly. It was a knowledge that proposals 
were ‘impractical’: ‘that simple homespun understanding of the implications that 
planners––with their theoretical mappings and models that they might base upon 
incorrect population growth figures or whatever they might be––simply don’t appear to 
take account of ’. This ‘grainy sort of grounded knowledge’ was seen as critical, without 
which places ‘lose sight of what we understand by community’. The consequence was 
that ‘people feel as if they are spoken down to’.
Some planners lamented the inability of formal planning processes to value such 
inputs, whilst feeling unable to change the systemic, structural conditions which shape 
engagement:
All this constrains you from actually trying to deliver what it is, not just what 
the districts want, but what residents want. It’s almost like this perception that 
all of your evidence has to be really objective and technical. Those voices get 
lost amongst all of that … we would like to give them much more weight and 
much more emphasis. But you always come back to how you can defend it, 
because that’s how the Inspector, or the government, or developers, or whoever, 
interpret this particular issue.
 — Discussion: imagined and actual institutional contexts for co-production
The above case study illustrates an actual institutional context of policymaking 
inside the new metropolitan governance structures of the GMCA. The case study of 
the GMSF reveals a context in which officers must ‘do’ rather than ‘think’, in cultures 
that are risk averse and stifled. With little time or dedicated resources to support 
bespoke forms of participation for those with most at stake, officers relied on tried-
and-tested forms of consultation and the in-house skills of communications and media 
experts to manage messages and control information. This led to certain groups being 
prioritized as having more at stake than others, such as the ‘young’. Spatial diversity 
was not actively addressed, compounded by unequal staffing across districts which 
exacerbated structural inequalities. With differential access to resources across districts, 
the parameters and scope for influence were not clear.
Complex negotiations between local authorities in the context of fluid and 
uncertain institutional arrangements meant that decision-making processes were not 
legible, even to those within the system. In the context of devolution and austerity, 
there were clear limits to the actual powers and responsibilities of city-regional officials. 
Rather than a binary ‘them’ and ‘us’ that pits public against planner, our interviews 
revealed how planners are making do and muddling through. Austerity and devolution 
combined created a landscape that shaped and foreclosed spatial decision making. 
Timeframes were unclear, goalposts changing and, with little space for contestation or 
discussion, ‘local voice is downgraded’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012: 98).
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Undertaken through the ‘landscape of antagonism’ (Newman, 2013: 3297) 
planners’ expertise was eroded, with the consequence that private expertise was 
elevated and community participation and collaboration in planning de-privileged. 
In order to speed up development, the expertise of many non-planners was enrolled 
in the process whereby ‘developers mobilize a very diverse set of specialized firms 
with expertise spanning heritage, environmental impact assessments, economic 
development, community engagement, landscape architecture, transport’ (Robin, 2018: 
8). Furthermore, planners themselves had to employ such experts, in order to justify 
that they had met planning requirements. Alongside the marginalization of planning 
expertise, we found the devaluing of community expertise, seen as neither unique nor 
distinctive in its own right.
Austerity policies compounded existing factors militating against any realization 
of co-productive policymaking. The interviews drew attention repeatedly to the legacy 
of the ‘Manchester Model’ origin story and how, in the context of the GMSF, this had 
led to a close relationship between the property industry and local political leaders, and 
strengthened the overall growth-first strategy of the city-region. Whilst the austerity 
context is critical in shaping constraints on local authorities, these other structural 
factors further challenge co-production’s potential in policymaking. Furthermore, 
when the austerity context of policymaking is situated as an institutional and political 
necessity, opportunities to think differently are sidelined.
In Table 2, we contrast the existing institutional context revealed through the case 
study (column 3) alongside the institutional preconditions imagined for co-production 
in the first section of the article (columns 1 and 2). Our case study casts strong doubt 
on whether the institutional conditions exist in which the promise of co-production 
could be realized. Both Greater Manchester’s first mover status in devolution and 
the spatial planning process as a ‘first test’ of the new mayoral powers make this a 
critical case for generating wider insights and developing our conceptualization of 
‘austerity co-production’. Table 2 offers an analytical tool and set of criteria which could 
be mobilized by others to assess the fit between existing institutional policymaking 
contexts and the promise of co-production. Further research is needed to test the wider 
applicability of the austerity co-production thesis, across different policy areas and city-
regions in England and internationally.
TABLE 2 Imagined and actual contexts for co-production
Challenges to which co-production is 
posited as a solution
Institutional preconditions for 
co-production Actually existing institutional context
The failure of existing processes to deal 
with chronic urban injustice
Structures and processes for those who 
have ‘most at stake’ to be engaged as 
equal partners; bespoke and tailored 
processes for participation; time and 
resources for engagement; active 
tackling of structural inequalities
Participation layered on top of existing 
structures; cost efficiency prioritized; 
one size fits all processes; few 
incentives for engagement; structural 
inequalities shaping engagement not 
addressed
The lack of transparency and 
exclusiveness of existing processes of 
decision making
Transparent and legible decision and 
policymaking processes; options to 
contribute and change outcomes; 
clear understanding of parameters and 
timeframes; space for contestation and 
debate
Unclear decision making; changing 
goalposts; conflicting rationalities; 
no processes for managing conflict; 
foreclosing debate; opaque and 
specialized processes; dominance 
of national-local and cross-local 
negotiations
The complexity of urban issues requiring 
diverse skills and expertise
Cultures of epistemic equality; different 
inputs recognized as valuable and 
distinctive; openness to new ideas
Marginalization of professional 
expertise; epistemic closure; no clear 
value attached to citizen knowledge; 
little time or space to think; closure 
to new knowledge inputs; privileged 
inputs from private sector and 
consultants
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Risks realized? The challenge of austerity co-production
Our analysis and findings suggest caution in embracing the radical promise of 
co-production without understanding the institutional contexts in which it would be 
implemented. Having set out the context of English devolution and austerity policies 
since 2010, we identified three institutional preconditions necessary to avoid the risk 
of what we have called austerity co-production. Our case study of the actually existing 
institutional context for spatial planning in Greater Manchester suggests the risk is 
real: that the institutional preconditions for a radical implementation of co-production 
are not currently met in a devolved, austerity-shaped metropolitan governance system.
Austerity co-production, we argue, is the manifestation of doing ‘more with less’, 
a variant of collaborative governance, underpinned by the rule of consensus and with 
a prioritization of certain forms of expertise over others. We have defined austerity 
co-production as a weak form of collaborative governance for dealing with resource 
scarcity and fragmented multiple forms of expertise. Austerity co-production draws 
attention to the dark side of co-production, as urban decision makers are urged to do 
more with less in the context of ever decreasing resources and support from national 
government. Personal engagement and dedication from officers to perform their public 
duties in the face of cuts––in this case demonstrated by planners––then become ways 
that austerity co-production is reformed, and reborn, rather than contested. ‘Temporary’ 
solutions and attempts to make do become the new benchmark, upon which further cuts 
can be made.
The co-productive turn reflects an attempt to develop processes which deal both 
with uncertain and changing environments and the diverse integration of expertise. 
However, in the context of national-local relationships, planning regulations and new 
devolutionary arrangements, the legitimacy to act for English city-regions is seriously 
delimited, reducing the scope for co-production. Power-gaming across authorities is 
informed by access to and levels of resources, favouring those better equipped. Austerity 
co-production highlights the risk of co-production as a universal solution to urban 
governance issues: whilst the radical promise of co-production centres those with 
most at stake at the heart of decision-making processes, attention must be paid to how 
co-production is shaped by existing policy practices and institutions.
The problem and challenge we raise here is not with the idea of co-production 
per se, but the conditions under which co-production takes place and what it (re)
produces. In the English context, co-production may be insufficient, and even produce 
counter-intended effects, in reproducing elite forms of governance. The danger is that 
the discourse and imperfect practice of co-production become part of the silencing 
or sidelining of community voices––they can only be heard if they are continuing 
business-as-usual development, not if they question it. Co-production involves multiple 
parties, and there is wider concern that ideas, policies and priorities that emerge from 
within neighbourhoods are being ‘rescripted’ to ensure conformity to a bounded form 
of collaboration (Parker et al., 2015). The double bind is clear: co-production can be a 
short-term solution to urban austerity, but it can also reproduce it.
Co-production has many potential benefits as a way to address messy, complex 
and multi-scalar problems, as well as a way to relate and challenge the everyday 
impacts of austerity and inequality. Yet to realise the promise of co-production in 
challenging contexts, more attention should be paid to the way that contexts operate, 
so that processes do not reproduce the very challenges that they wish to address. This 
suggests that widespread caution is needed in the embrace of co-production without 
concern for wider institutional contexts and conditions. Whilst such different contexts 
will equally mediate the promise of co-production––for instance, in terms of degrees 
of decentralization, extent of neoliberalization or cultures of policymaking––there 
are pressures on local authorities world-wide to do more with less in a context of 
increasingly fragmented governance systems and forms of expertise. This means 
HABERMEHL AND PERRY 16
prioritizing the governance, institutional and cultural changes necessary to contribute 
to the radical possibility of co-production.
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